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This paper analyses some particular characteristics of merger and acquisition (M&A) 
transactions in an emerging market (Portugal) using a sample of 52 M&A targets 
between 1989 and 2001. Our evidence shows that the run-up effect in the Portuguese 
market is of a significantly larger magnitude (as a proportion of total abnormal returns 
for targets) than the one shown in studies for well developed capital markets (UK and 
US). In fact, the cumulative run-up target stock price abnormal increase in this 
emerging market is on average 13% in the 40 days before the M&A announcement, 
which corresponds to almost sixty percent of the entire cumulative abnormal return of 
23% enjoyed by target shareholders around the announcement date (-40,+40). The 
presence of acquirers’ toeholds in targets is positively related to the relative magnitude 
of such run-up effect, while hostility and the presence of large shareholders in the 
target have a negative impact. Evidence is also presented that abnormal returns for 
both bidders and targets are substantially lower in bearish markets as compared to 
bullish markets, with acquirers experiencing sizeable negative abnormal returns in 
bear markets but significantly positive ones in bull periods. Overall, our results caution 
for the existence of particularities of M&A transactions in emerging markets in 
comparison to well developed markets, and point to a number of research directions 
that are relevant both to emerging and developed markets.   2
1  Introduction 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) have been the subject of a large number of studies 
and intense academic debate. Such research, however, is almost all concerned with 
M&A transactions in well developed capital markets, with relatively few papers 
focusing on the particularities of such activity in emerging markets.  
 
This study adds to the literature by analysing a sample of 52 M&A announcements 
from 1989 to 2001 in an emerging market (Portugal). We document a number of 
interesting results, some of which suggest or reinforce a degree of uniqueness for the 
M&A activity in less developed capital markets.  
 
In particular, our evidence shows that the run-up effect we observed in the Portuguese 
market is of a significantly larger magnitude (as a proportion of total return for targets) 
than that shown in previous studies for well developed capital markets (UK and US). 
In fact, the run-up effect for the window (-40,0) before the M&A announcement in this 
emerging market is 13%, corresponding to almost sixty percent of the entire abnormal 
return of 23% enjoyed by target shareholders around the announcement date. At the 
same time, such total returns for target shareholders are lower than those observed in 
the US and UK markets, which may be explained by the usually large toeholds held by 
the bidder before the bid in the Portuguese market. In addition, we test and confirm 
Schwert’s (1996) mark-up pricing hypothesis that the observed run-up effect does not 
reduce the premium offered at the announcement date, thereby increasing the total cost 
of the M&A transaction for bidders on a larger magnitude that in more developed 
markets. We also document that the presence of large shareholders in the acquiring 
firms and of toeholds in target firms significantly increases cumulative abnormal stock   3
returns (CARs) for bidders´ shareholders. Similarly, such toeholds reduce returns for 
targets, as well as the presence of large shareholders in such firms. These last results 
are in accordance with an agency theory perspective where large shareholders can play 
a monitoring role, both in the acquiring and target firms. Finally, we document that 
abnormal returns for both bidders and targets are substantially lower in bearish 
markets as compared to bullish markets, with acquirers experiencing sizeable negative 
abnormal returns in bear markets but significantly positive ones in bull periods. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a summary of the relevant 
M&A literature and the motivation for this study. Next, we describe the methodology 
used, the sampling procedures, and the data collection. Section 4 presents major 
empirical results. The last section summarises the findings and the limitations of this 
study, and suggests directions for future research. 
 
2  Motivation and previous literature 
 
 
M&A is one of the most researched areas in Finance (Weston et al, 2001). Still, 
existing studies have been concerned almost exclusively with a single market (the 
US). Only recently has the UK market been the subject of more intense research (see, 
for instance, Franks and Mayer, 1996, and Sudarsanam et al, 1996), and few studies 
exist on smaller, less developed markets. One of these few studies is that of Ocaña 
(1997), who studied M&A activity in Spain using a sample of transactions between 
1990 and 1994. 
 
The research on M&A has been mostly concerned with analyzing and measuring 
wealth effects for targets and bidders around announcement dates (Jensen and Ruback,   4
1983), gains for bondholders (Asquith and Kim, 1982), the impact of different 
methods of payment (Huang and Walking, 1987), efficiency issues (Scherer, 1988), 
run-up and mark-up returns (Schwert, 1996), long term performance (Agrawal and 
Jaffe, 2000), free riding problems (Schleifer and Vishny, 1986), managerial hubris 
(Roll, 1986) and agency problems (Jensen, 1986). 
 
One major result of these studies is that abnormal returns are typically high for targets 
(30% according to Jensen and Ruback, 1983) while bidders tend to receive small or 
negative returns around the announcement of M&A transactions. The competitive 
nature of the market for corporate control has been seen as a likely cause for the small 
return for bidders (Bradley et al, 1983). There is no evidence of bondholders 
expropriation except, perhaps, in some extreme situations like leveraged buyouts 
(Warga and Welch, 1993). Weston et al (2001) conclude that the apparent overall 
wealth creation around the announcement date is mostly caused by the expectation of 
operating and financial synergies. However, Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) observe that, 
unlike tender offers which command long term non-negative abnormal returns for 
bidders, mergers tend to be followed by a long-term negative impact on the bidder’s 
share price. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) suggest that a possible explanation for the 
somewhat unglamorous long term performance of bidders may be Roll’s (1986) 
hubris hypothesis, while others take the view that agency costs associated with 
empire-building and other self-serving behavior from the part of acquiring managers 
might be blamed (Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992), coupled with poor corporate 
governance (Jensen, 1993). 
 
Schwert (1996) documents that target prices tend to climb up some 42 days before an 
M&A announcement, with the largest increase happening in the last 21 days before   5
the event. Schwert reports that this run-up effect is on average 13.3%, or almost a 
third of the total target return (run-up plus mark-up), which amounts to 37% in the 
case of successful transactions. 
 
Finally, the shareholder structure of both bidders and targets bidder toeholds seem to 
be an important influence on the observed returns. For Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
only a large shareholder, in an otherwise disperse ownership structure, can facilitate 
the firm’s acquisition. Slusky and Caves (1991) present evidence of a negative 
relation between large shareholders and the takeover bid premium. Grossman and Hart 
(1980) predict that the larger an initial toehold on a target company, the larger the 
gains to bidders, while in Hirshleifer and Titman’s (1990) model an initial toehold 
increases the probability of a successful bid and will reduce the bid premium for target 
shareholders. Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) and Holderness and Shehan (1985), 
among others, present results in accordance with large shareholders monitoring 
managers’ activities. 
 
In an analysis of large M&A transactions in the European market, Goergen and 
Renneboog (2003) document a cumulative abnormal return of 23% for targets, with 
almost all of this return being observed before the announcement (run-up return). 
They also show some disparities in returns according to the countries where the 
transaction takes place, with returns being substantially higher when a UK target or 
bidder is present. In the case of Southern Europe (which includes Portugal) the authors 
document a run-up of 6.2% for domestic transactions and a total abnormal return of 
just 1.9%, but the small number of observations (only 7 transactions) does not allow 
reasonable inferences from such results. 
   6
Given that, as Becht and Roel (1999) document, the shareholder voting power in 
Europe is highly concentrated in comparison with the US and UK, one would expect 
that in an European emerging market like Portugal toeholds should be in general high 
before an M&A transaction therefore potentially leading to lower bid premiums. 
 
Ocaña et al (1997) presents a study of M&A transactions in Spain for the period of 
1990 to 1994. Ocanã et al’s view their results as “quite similar to the pattern observed 
in the larger US and UK stock markets” (Ocaña et al, 1997, p.152), finding that target 
shareholders earn a cumulative abnormal return of 40% over the period (-40, 40), 
where about two thirds of this are earned before the announcement date. Ocanã et al 
(1997) do not present results for bidding firms nor provide any further analyses other 
than the computation of CARs for targets. In their study they concede that a limitation 
of their study is the fact that the mergers in their sample took place in a period of 
particular institutional change (that of the opening of the Spanish Economy to the 
EU)1, making it difficult to generalize the results of their research.  
 




Schwert’s (1996) substitution hypothesis between Run-ups and Mark-ups 
 
One of the objectives of this study is to analyse if, in the context of an emerging 
market, there is any information leakage about the tender offer before it is announced. 
                                                           
1 In Ocaña et al´s (1997) study no information is provided on the existence of initial toeholds by 
bidders on the target companies.   7
So, it is important to analyse, as in Schwert (1996), if any substitution effects exist 
between the increase of the stock price before the announcement of the tender offer 
(run-up) and the increase of the stock price after the announcement of the tender offer 
(mark-up) 2. 
 
One way to test that substitution hypothesis is to consider the relation between the 
premium paid by the acquiring firm and the rise of the stock price before the 
announcement of the tender offer (run-up): 
 
Premiumj = a + bRun-upj + uj 
 
The Substitution Hypothesis of Schwert (1996) implies that the total premium3 is not 
affected by the positive evolution of the stock price before the announcement of the 
tender offer (run-up) in a way that the b coefficient in the previous equation should be 
equal to zero. On the other hand, the Mark-up Pricing Hypothesis implies that the total 
premium increases in equal proportion of the increase in the stock price before the 
announcement of the tender offer (run-up) and, therefore, b coefficient in the previous 
equation should be equal to one. A b coefficient between zero and one implies a 
partial substitution, which means that the increase of the stock price before the 
announcement of the tender offer increases the total premium to be paid by the 
acquiring firm, but only by a fraction of the increase in the stock price, being that 
fraction represented by the b coefficient. 
 
                                                           
2 The abnormal returns were computed using the standard Market Model as presented by Weston et al 
(1998). 
3 Schwert (1996) considers the premium as the sum of the run-up and the mark-up. 
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Since the total premium is the sum of the run-up with the mark-up, the previous 
equation is equivalent to the regression of the mark-up over the run-up: 
 
Mark-upj = a + (b-1)Run-upj + uj 
 
If the Substitution Hypothesis holds true then the (b-1) coefficient above should be 
equal to -1 (when the run-up is high, the mark-up is reduced by the same value), or 
alternatively, b should be equal to 0. If the Mark-up Pricing Hypothesis holds true 
then the (b-1) coefficient above should be equal to zero (the mark-up is not related to 
the run-up), that is, b should be equal to 1. 
 
To determine the run-up and the mark-up we computed targets’ abnormal returns in 
the periods (-40;0) and (+1;+40), respectively. 
 
Test of the Hubris and Agency Hypotheses 
 
Another objective of this study is to analyse the role of the hubris and agency 
hypotheses as motivations for mergers and acquisitions in the Portuguese market. For 
that purpose we used a regression of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over a 
number of independent variables related to the ownership structure, firm performance, 
hostility, relative size, among others, as will be explained later. 
 
One of the mechanisms for controlling agency problems and align managers is large 
shareholders monitoring managers activities. A target firm that is efficiently 
monitored by large shareholders will be well valued before the announcement of the 
offer. Hence, the target value creation by the acquiring firm after the acquisition will   9
be smaller. This limits the premium that the acquiring firm can afford and it will be 
lower with the increase of the shares owned by a large shareholders. Slusky and Caves 
(1991) provide empirical evidence for the negative relation between large 
shareholders and the premium paid by acquiring firms, although Sudarsanam (1996) 
doesn’t find any significant relation in the UK market. 
 
For the acquiring firms, if monitoring activities by large shareholders are efficient 
then the acquiring firm shareholders should gain. If such monitoring is inefficient then 
managers will engage in value diminishing acquisitions, paying excessive premiums 
due to hubris, imposing losses to their shareholders. 
 
Therefore, our first hypothesis is defined as 
 
H1: Target firm shareholders lose (H1a), and bidders shareholders gain (H1b) with 
efficient monitoring by large shareholders. 
 
Grossman and Hart (1980) propose toeholds as a solution for the free-riding problem. 
Their model suggests that toeholds help the acquiring firm in making good 
acquisitions, with the consequent gains for their shareholders. The larger the toehold 
the higher should then gains become for the acquiring firm shareholders. Additionally, 
the bigger the toehold the higher the likelihood of an offer (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) 
and the higher the probability of a successful acquisition (Hirshleifer and Titman, 
1990). In both models, an initial toehold decreases the premium paid to the target 
shareholders. Moreover, a higher toehold allows the acquiring firm to have better 
information about the target, thus reducing the possibility of hubris. 
   10
Our second hypothesis if thus formulated as 
 
H2: The bigger the toehold the smaller the gains for target shareholders (H2a) and the 
higher the gains for bidder shareholders (H2b). 
 
The Tobin’s q ratio has been frequently used to assess the managers’ performance or 
quality. Lang et al (1989) and Hasbrouck (1985), document that target firms usually 
have low Tobin’s q ratios, which could be interpreted as the result of a poor quality 
managing team. For Lang et al (1989) and Servaes (1991) higher gains are achieved 
when well managed firms (high Tobin’s q ratio) acquire firms that are managed 
inefficiently (low Tobin’s q ratio). In our study, the Tobin’s q ratio will be calculated 
as the ratio between the market capitalization added to the book value of debt (the 
“market value” of the assets) and the accounting value of equity added with the book 
value of debt (the “accounting value” of the assets). Thus, it will be calculated as the 
market value of the firm divided by its accounting value4. Although the method for 
the calculation of the Tobin’s q ratio is a proxy for the more correct method, Chung 
and Pruitt (1994) report that a very similar method to the one proposed in this study 
explains at least 96.6% of the variability of the original model proposed by 
Lindenberg and Ross (1981)5. 
 
Our third hypothesis is then 
 
                                                           
4 For other definitions of the Tobin’s q ratio see Perfect and Wiles (1994). 
5 Later we will analyse the variable Price/Book Value (PBV) as an alternative to the variable Tobin’s q.   11
H3: Acquiring firms shareholders (H3a) and target firms shareholders (H3b) 
experience larger gains when the target firm has a low Tobin’s q ratio and the 
acquiring firm has a high Tobin’s q ratio. 
 
The literature on M&A identifies a set of bid characteristics with a potential impact on 
abnormal returns for the acquiring and target shareholders. When testing the previous 
hypotheses we therefore control for the following variables: method of payment 
(Asquith et al, 1983; Huang and Walkling, 1987; Franks et al, 1988), hostility (Huang 
and Walkling, 1987; Datta et al, 1992; Weston et al, 1998), relative size (Ravenscraft 
and Scherer, 1989; Hasbrouck, 1985; Palepu, 1986; Morck et al, 1988, Shivdasani, 
1993, Comment and Schwert, 1995; Schwert, 2000), industry proximity (Denis et al, 
1997; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Agrawal et al, 1992). 
 
To determine the impact of the independent variables related to the hubris and agency 
theories over the abnormal returns for the shareholders we use a regression analysis of 
the CARs over the variables related to the ownership structure and the control 
variables6. Table 1 provides a summary of all the explanatory variables included in 







                                                           
6 These control variables represent the process dynamics of the tender offer. 
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Table 1- Determinants of Target or Bidder Abnormal Returns 
 
Variable Description  Reason  for 
Inclusion/Hypothesis 
Ownership Structure    
ACQLS  Acquirer ownership by large 
shareholders  
Monitoring mechanism on 
managers’ activities (agency 
theory)  
 
TARLS  Target ownership by large 
shareholders 
Monitoring mechanism on 
managers’ activities (agency 
theory)  
 
TOEH  Existing toehold of acquirer on 
target before bid 
Influence on probability of bid 
success / premium reduction 
effect / hubris reduction 
Managing team    
ACQTOB  Acquirer’s Tobin Q (Market 
capitalization of equity +Book 
value of Debt) / Book value of 
Net Assets 
Acquirer management’s quality 
measure 
   
TARTOB  Target’s Tobin Q (Market 
capitalization of equity +Book 
value of Debt) / Book value of 
Net Assets 
Target management’s quality 
measure 
Performance    
ACQPERF  Acquirer’s cumulative stock 
returns for the last 2 years 
before announcement 
Acquirer’s stock recent 
performance  
   
TARPERF  Target’s cumulative stock 
returns for the last 2 years 
before announcement 
Target’s stock returns recent 
performance 
Other control variables    
HOST  Hostility (1-Hostile offer; 0-Non 
hostile offer) 
Bargaining power of the acquirer 
   
METPAY  Method of Payment (1-Cash 
only; 0-Other than cash only) 
Information asymmetry 
   
RELSIZE  Relative size of bidder versus 
target 
Superior managing skills of 
acquirer / lower impact of 
acquisition on acquirer’s returns 
when target is relatively small 
   
INDREL Industry  Relatedness  between 
bidder and target (1-Same 
industry sector; 0-Different 
industry sector) 
Operating synergies / potential 
for market power  
   
LEGIS  Legislation Dummy (1-Offer 
made during Sapateiro Law; 0-
Offer not made during Sapateiro 
Law)  
Stock market legislation impact 
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3.2 Sample Description 
 
This study is based on an initial set of all 165 tender offers recorded in Portugal 
between 1989 and 2001. The data was collected from the Portuguese Stock Exchange 
(BVLP – Bolsa de Valores de Lisboa e Porto, now Euronext Lisbon) and from its 
historical database (Dathis). 
 
From the 165 tender offers we selected those that were launched by, or that targeted, 
listed firms in the Portuguese stock market. We eliminated from the sample the so-
called “potestativas” offers7. We also eliminated stocks that traded in less than 50% of 
the days of the estimation window (-200;-41). Only the stocks listed in the “Mercado 
de Cotações Oficiais (MCO)” (the major secondary market for equities in Portugal) 
were considered. 
 
Therefore, for the acquiring companies our final sample is composed of 39 tender 
offers launched by 23 different firms. For target firms the sample is slightly larger, 
with 52 tender offers that aimed at 41 different firms. 
 
Table 2 summarises how the sample was constructed: 
Table 2 – Sample Tender Offers 
 
  Targets Bidders 
Total number of tender offers  165  165 
(-) Number of special “potestativas” offers  12  12 
(-) Firms traded for fewer than 50% of days in estimation period   5  4 
(-) Firms delisted in the period (-200, 40)  27  14 
(-) Firms not listed in the main equity market (“Mercado de Cotações 
Oficiais”) 
69 96 
Final number of firms in the sample  52  39 
                                                           
7 These “potestativa” offers are special tender offers of compulsory acceptance by target shareholders 
which can be launched in Portugal by a bidder that already holds 90% or more of the shares listed in the 
stock market and that aims to ensure the delisting of such firm.   14
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of the acquiring firms and their bids8. 
 
Table 3 – Summary of the characteristics of the acquiring firms 







N Valid 39 32 39
M i s s i n g 070
Mean 1,064,714,468 12.625 41.205
Median 605,476,801 6.220 50.000
Std. Deviation 1,476,221,252 22.880 29.710
Skewness 2.190 3.500 -0.222
Std. Error of Skewness 0.378 0.414 0.378
Kurtosis 4.242 13.185 -1.102
Std. Error of Kurtosis 0.741 0.809 0.741
Minimum 11,050,000 0.240 0.000
Maximum 5,620,000,000 113.160 99.000
 
(Units: Market Capitalizations are in euros, Toeholds as percentages of existing shares). 
 
As it can be seen from Table 3 the size of the bidding firms is quite variable. In terms 
of market capitalization, the average size is about 1 billion euros, with a maximum of 
5.6 billion euros. It should be pointed out that some of the acquiring firms, namely 
financial institutions, with high market capitalizations make the sample distribution 
somewhat skewed. In terms of relative size the acquiring firm is, on average, 12.6 
times larger than the target firm. Nevertheless, the median relative size is 6.2 times. 
 
The bidder’s initial toehold is particularly high (mean of 41.2% of the target’s shares 
and a median of 50.0%), and this represents a significant difference relatively to the 
general empirical evidence for well developed markets like the US and UK. The 
highest toehold is 99.0%. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), for instance, the 
                                                           
8 In this descriptive statistics we didn’t consider the fact that some firms launched more than one tender 
offer.   15
toehold of the biggest shareholder is 15.4%, and the toehold of the five biggest 
shareholders is 28.8%9.  
 
From the 39 tender offers only 6 were partial acquisitions, which represent 15.4% of 
the sample. Only 5 tender offers were hostile. On the other hand, cash was the main 
method of payment (26 tender offers), while shares were used in 8 acquisitions and a 
mix of cash and shares was used in 5 offers.  
 
Table 4 summarizes the characteristics of the target firms and the offers received. 
 
Table 4 – Summary of the characteristics of  







N Valid 52 25 52
Missing 0 27 0
Mean 351,698,604 5.904 43.885
Median 107,860,057 2.650 51.000
Std. Deviation 551,860,771 6.119 31.258
Skewness 2.723 1.337 -0.154
Std. Error of Skewness 0.330 0.464 0.330
Kurtosis 8.562 1.296 -1.175
Std. Error of Kurtosis 0.650 0.902 0.650
Minimum 1,988,972 0.240 0.000
Maximum 2,855,736,000 23.330 99.000
 
(Units: Market Capitalizations are in euros; Toeholds as percentages of existing shares) 
 
In terms of the target’s market capitalization, the average size also shows a great 
variability. The average is 351 million euros, which represents about a third of the 
average size of the acquiring firms’ sample. The relative size has a mean of 5.9 and a 
median of 2.610. The relative size for this sample is about half the size of the sample 
for the acquiring firms.  
 
                                                           
9 The sample for this work was 456 firms included in Fortune 500.   16
The initial toehold is once again particularly high (mean of 43.9% and median of 
51.0%). The highest toehold is 99.0%.  
 
From the 52 tender offers only 6 were partial acquisitions, which represent 11.5% of 
the sample. We found 9 tender offers which were hostile, which represents 17.3% of 
the sample. On the other hand, cash was the main method of payment (46 tender 
offers), while shares were used in 2 acquisitions and a mix of cash and shares was 
used in 4 offers. This means that the cash method of payment was more predominant 
in this sample. 
 
In summary, the sample of the acquiring firms is centred in a set of tender offers were 
the differences in size are much higher. In terms of toeholds the samples are very 
similar, but the high toehold is a distinctive factor in our sample in comparison to the 
evidence from well developed markets. 
 
4  Empirical results 
 
4.1 Bidder Shareholders’ Abnormal Returns 
 
The bidder shareholders’ abnormal returns are presented in Table 5 11: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
10 Since some firms were not listed in the Portuguese Stock Market it was impossible to determine the 
market capitalization, and thus the relative size for some acquisitions. 
11 For the tender offers that were launched by more than one firm it was considered the impact in those 
firms individually. On the other hand, bidders that launched, in the same day, more than one tender 
offer it was considered the impact in that particular firm. Thus, our sample is composed of 40 tender 
offers. 
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Table 6 – CARs for the bidder shareholders 
 
Window CAR var(CAR) z
-40;+40 0.00743 0.0000074 2.73
-20;+20 0.01065 0.0000081 3.73
-10;+10 -0.00829 0.0000081 -2.90
-5;+5 -0.00836 0.0000085 -2.87
-5;+3 -0.00020 0.0000091 -0.07
-1;+1 0.00539 0.0000110 1.63
0;0 0.00479 0.0000004 8.09
 
 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for bidder shareholders for the largest 
window (-40;+40) are 0.74%, statistically different from zero. For the event window (-
20;+20) the CARs are 1.07%, also statistically different from zero. In the periods 
around the announcement date, the abnormal returns are slightly negative, but it is not 
possible for the windows (-5;+3) and (-1;+1) to reject the null hypothesis that the 
returns for the bidders shareholders are equal to zero. Nevertheless, for the window (-
1;+1) and for the announcement day of the offer they are positive (0.48%), which is 
consistent with the results of Asquith (1983). Our results, although inferior in value, 
are consistent with the work of Jensen and Ruback (1983), which reports that bidders’ 
shareholder abnormal returns in tender offers are 4%, statistically significant. Also 
Bradley (1980) and Schipper and Thompson (1983) report increases in the value of 
the bidders firm. In a two day analysis, Dodd (1980) finds significant abnormal 
returns –1.09%, while Asquith (1983) and Eckbo (1983) refer slightly positive 
abnormal returns, but statistically insignificant. Our results are therefore consistent 
with the works of later authors.  
 
In general terms, one could argue that the lack of economically significant positive 
returns for bidders at the announcement of acquisitions might be caused by the 
competitive nature of the market for corporate control. Such results contradict the   18
managerialism hypothesis (Mueller, 1969) where equity agency problems in the 
bidder explain the launching of bids, which would translate into negative returns for 
bidders at the launching of unanticipated acquisitions. 
 
In Figure 1, the pattern of the bidders shareholders’ CARs for the largest window (-
40;+40) is presented: 
 
















4.2 Target Shareholders’ Abnormal Returns 
 
The target shareholders’ abnormal returns are presented in Table 7: 
 
Table 7 – Target Shareholders’ CARs 
Window CAR var(CAR) z
-40;+40 0.22655 0.0000237 46.54
-20;+20 0.14975 0.0000300 27.34
-10;+10 0.13514 0.0000399 21.39
-5;+5 0.12465 0.0000654 15.42
-5;+3 0.12835 0.0000775 14.58
-1;+1 0.08181 0.0001562 6.55
0;0 0.01079 0.0000005 15.38
   19
Target shareholders achieve high gains from offers. For the window (-40;+40) the 
abnormal returns are of 22.6%. For this period, target returns are considerably lower 
than the 40,0% reported by Ocaña et al (1997) for the Spanish market. For the window 
(-20;+20) the abnormal return is of 14.9%, also significantly below the 35.2% 
reported by Ocaña et al (1997). Additionally, our results are smaller than those 
reported in the survey of Jensen and Ruback (1983) which suggests abnormal returns 
of 30% for tender offers. 
 
As it can be seen in Figure 2, most of the target shareholders’ gain occurs before the 
announcement date of the tender offer. This observation is further exploited in the 
next section. 
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4.3 Information Leakage to the Market  
 
In spite of the fact that the larger part of the gains for the target shareholders occur 
near the announcement date of the operation [12.5% for the window (-5;+5)], it can be 
seen that the upward movement in target share prices is initiated  40 days before that 
date. I fact a cumulative abnormal return for target shareholders of 13.1% occurs in 
the window (-40;0), of which 9.3% is concentrated in the period (-35;-5). These 
results are similar to those of Ocaña et al (1997) which detected that the CARs start to 
rise about 30 days before the announcement date. Our results are also consistent with 
Schwert (1996) that reports that the CARs start to rise 42 days (almost two months) 
before the tender offer is announced. These results seem to suggest that there is a 
leakage of information to the market about the tender offer before the announcement 
becomes public. Other possible explanation (which we cannot test) for the observed 
behaviour maybe the bidding firm buying shares in the target firm in order to increase 
its toehold before the tender offer is announced or simply the occurrence of rumours.  
 
Regardless of possible explanations for this observation, one should stress the 
important relative magnitude of the observed run-up: for a total abnormal return of 
22.6% for target shareholders, about sixty percent (or 13.1% out of 22.6%) of this 
takes place before the announcement date. This is in sharp contrast with results from 
more developed countries, namely those of Schwert (1996) who documents that the 
observed run-up accounts for about a third only of total abnormal return. 
 
An interesting point is to analyse if a substitution effect exists between the increase in 
the stock price before the announcement of the tender offer (run-up) and the increase 
in the stock price after the announcement of the tender offer (mark-up). For that   21
purpose, and according to Schwert (1996), the following model was estimated by 
linear regression: 
 
Premiumj = a + bRun-upj + uj 
 
Table 8 provides the estimation results: 
 










The run-up coefficient (b) of 1.047 is extremely close to the one reported by Schwert 
(1996) for his main sample (1.075). Accordingly, the hypothesis that stands is the 
Mark-up Pricing Hypothesis. So, the increase in the stock price after the 
announcement of the tender offer (mark-up) doesn’t seem to be related to the increase 
in the target stock price before the announcement of the tender offer. A consequence 
of this observation is that the run-up represents, from the bidders’ point of view, an 
increased cost of the acquisition, since the premium is higher if a run-up effect exists 
before the announcement of the tender offer. For that reason it is of great importance 
for the bidder to control the flow of information to the market, with the purpose of 
minimizing the acquisition cost. 
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4.4 Total Abnormal Returns 
 
The total return is the weighted average of the bidder and target shareholders’ 
abnormal returns, where the weights are the market capitalization of each stock. Only 
tender offers where simultaneously the bidder and the target were publicly traded were 
considered in the computation of total returns. For that reason the sample is reduced to 
22 tender offers. The results should therefore be interpreted with a degree of caution.  
 
Table 9 shows the total returns for all the windows considered: 
 
Table 9 – Total Returns. 
Window CAR var(CAR) z
-40;+40 0.02761 0.00000881 9.30
-20;+20 0.02762 0.00001019 8.65
-10;+10 0.01943 0.00001289 5.41
-5;+5 0.01981 0.00001824 4.64
-5;+3 0.02784 0.00002038 6.17
-1;+1 0.00891 0.00003940 1.42
0;0 0.00770 0.00000102 7.63
 
 
The table above shows that total abnormal returns are positive for all the periods 
considered. For the periods (-40;+40) and (-20;+20) the total abnormal returns are 
positive (2.8%), and in both cases they are statistically significant. These results lead 
us to conclude that potential losses for the bidder shareholders are more than 
compensated by the gains for target shareholders. Our results are consistent with the 
results of Bradley et al (1983), Lang et al (1989), Kaplan and Weisbach (1990), 
Sudarsanam et al (1996), among others, but inconsistent with the work of Firth (1980) 
who reports overall losses for the bidder and target firms.   23
Since our sample is composed of only 22 tender offers, we also provide sign test 
results, which are presented in Table 10: 
 
Table 10 – Sign test for total abnormal return. 










From the results in Table 10 it is not possible to reject, for all the windows considered 
and for a p-value of 1%, the null hypothesis that the CARs have a null median. 
 









                                                           
12 For the tender offers that were launched by more than one firm we considered the impact in those 
firms individually. On the other hand, for bidders that launched, in the same day, more than one tender 
offer we considered the impact in that particular firm. Thus, our sample is composed of 38 tender 
offers. 
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Table 11 – Descriptive statistics for the independent  
variables in the analysis of returns for bidders. 
 
Mean Std. Deviation N
ACQLS 0.392 0.246 38
TOEH 0.438 0.295 38
ACQTOB 1.211 0.503 38
ACQPERF 0.354 0.643 38
RELSIZE 9.467 12.442 38
HOST 0.184 0.393 38
METPAY 0.763 0.431 38
INDREL 0.816 0.393 38




  ACQLS – Acquirers equity owned by large shareholders;  
  TOEH – Acquirers Toehold; 
  ACQTOB – Acquirers Tobin’s q; 
ACQPERF – Acquirers performance two years before the offer announcement; 
  RELSIZE – Relative Size; 
  HOST – Hostility; 
  METPAY – Method of payment; 
  INDREL – Industry relatedness; 
  LEGIS – Legislation dummy. 
 
The larger stockholders own, on average, 39.2% of the bidding firm. Such toehold is 
quite large, 43.8% on average. The bidding firm is on average 9.5 times bigger than 
the target firm. 18.4% of the tender offers were hostile. The method of payment more 
used was cash (almost 76% of the cases). About 81.6% of tender offers were industry 
related and 81.6% were launched during the period of the “Lei Sapateiro” legislation. 
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Table 12 – Pearson Correlation analysis for the explanatory variables of the 
CARs of the Bidders in the period (-40;+40). 
 
CARS ACQLS TOEH ACQTOB ACQPERF RELSIZE HOST METPAY INDREL LEGIS
CARS 1.000 0.406 0.286 -0.168 -0.376 -0.214 -0.036 0.122 0.058 0.042
ACQLS 0.406 1.000 0.198 0.050 0.144 -0.204 -0.173 0.022 -0.167 -0.069
TOEH 0.286 0.198 1.000 0.044 -0.153 0.033 -0.554 -0.107 -0.163 -0.384
ACQTOB -0.168 0.050 0.044 1.000 0.420 -0.019 -0.126 0.183 -0.329 -0.257
ACQPERF -0.376 0.144 -0.153 0.420 1.000 -0.002 0.197 -0.061 -0.346 -0.113
RELSIZE -0.214 -0.204 0.033 -0.019 -0.002 1.000 -0.192 -0.194 -0.052 0.224
HOST -0.036 -0.173 -0.554 -0.126 0.197 -0.192 1.000 0.265 0.051 0.051
METPAY 0.122 0.022 -0.107 0.183 -0.061 -0.194 0.265 1.000 -0.265 -0.105
INDREL 0.058 -0.167 -0.163 -0.329 -0.346 -0.052 0.051 -0.265 1.000 0.300
LEGIS 0.042 -0.069 -0.384 -0.257 -0.113 0.224 0.051 -0.105 0.300 1.000  
 
Legend: 
  ACQLS – Acquirers equity owned by large shareholders;  
  TOEH – Acquirers Toehold; 
  ACQTOB – Acquirers Tobin’s q; 
ACQPERF – Acquirers performance two years before the offer announcement; 
  RELSIZE – Relative Size; 
  HOST – Hostility; 
  METPAY – Method of payment; 
  INDREL – Industry relatedness; 
  LEGIS – Legislation dummy. 
 
 
The results of the regression of the independent variables over the dependent variable 
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Table 13 – CARs regression for bidders during the period (-40;+40) around the 
announcement date of the tender offer. 
 
Coefficient (B) Std. Error t Significance
(Constant) -0.254 0.155 -1.634 0.113
ACQLS 0.288 0.101 2.848 0.008
TOEH 0.212 0.105 2.014 0.054
ACQTOB 0.019 0.056 0.333 0.742
ACQPERF -0.114 0.046 -2.502 0.018
RELSIZE -0.002 0.002 -0.784 0.439
HOST 0.127 0.080 1.596 0.122
METPAY 0.011 0.062 0.175 0.862
INDREL -0.008 0.070 -0.108 0.915
LEGIS 0.084 0.070 1.199 0.241
R0 . 6 8 3
R² 0.467
R² adjust 0.295




  ACQLS – Acquirers equity owned by large shareholders;  
  TOEH – Acquirers Toehold; 
  ACQTOB – Acquirers Tobin’s q; 
ACQPERF – Acquirers performance two years before the offer announcement; 
  RELSIZE – Relative Size; 
  HOST – Hostility; 
  METPAY – Method of payment; 
  INDREL – Industry relatedness; 
  LEGIS – Legislation dummy. 
 
In the above model the explanatory power, R² adjusted, is 29.5%. The variables 
concerning the ownership structure, ACQLS and TOEH, are significant at a 1% level 
and near the 5% level, respectively. The positive coefficient of ACQLS suggests that 
the CARs for bidders increase with the stake owned by large shareholders. Therefore 
it is consistent with efficient monitoring by such shareholders, where equity agency 
problems arising from the relationship manager-shareholder are reduced. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis H1b, with the model of Shleifer and Vishny (1986),   27
and also with the work of Slusky and Caves (1991). The toehold of the bidding firm, 
TOEH, has a positive impact in the bidders’ CARs, which is in accordance with our 
hypothesis H2b, and with the models of Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), but is not 
consistent with the results of Slusky and Caves (1991) and Sudarsanam et al (1996).  
 
Regarding the variable ACQTOB, its coefficient is not significantly different from 
zero, although the positive coefficient is in agreement with our hypothesis H3a that 
acquiring firms have better quality management teams13. 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the stock market performance of the acquiring firm in the two 
years preceding the announcement of the tender offer (variable ACQPERF) has a 
negative coefficient at a 5% level of significance14. In contrast to the results of Dodd 
and Ruback (1977), Asquith (1983) and Mueller (1987), the bidders in our sample 
with the worst performance achieve the highest abnormal returns from tender offers. 
A possibility might be that the market perceives that these particular bidders are more 
prone to benefit from their acquisitions, particularly if these aim at reaching operating 
or other relevant synergies instead of being the consequence of managerialism 
(Mueller, 1969) or hubris (Roll, 1986).  
 
Regarding other control variables, the variable HOST presents a marginally 
significant positive coefficient, which seems to indicate that the bidders gain more 
                                                           
13 In another experiment, the variable related to the Tobin’s q was replaced by the variable Price/Book 
Value. The results were similar (coefficient of 0.0112, t of 0.474 and significance of 0.64). In terms of 
the explanatory power of the model, R² adjusted, this is improved marginally to 29.8%. 
14 It was analysed the variable related to the acquiring firm performance during the three years that 
preceded the announcement of the tender offer. Consequently, our sample was reduced to 32 tender 
offers. The new variable presented a coefficient of -0.0043, t of 0.108 and significance of 0.954. 
Although the coefficient sign remains the same, the explanatory power of the model decreases 
significantly to 13.1%. 
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when the operation is hostile. These results are in contrast to the general empirical 
evidence (Bradley et al, 1988; Pound, 1988; Servaes, 1991), among others. Although 
the small number of hostile operations in our sample does not allow strong inferences 
regarding the hostility factor, a possible explanation for what we observe might be that 
in the particular context of an emerging market hostile acquisitions are undertaken 
only when the acquiring firm is convinced that these will bring clear benefits for the 
acquirer, which would then translate into higher abnormal returns in the stock 
market15.  
 
In what concerns the method of payment, variable METPAY, the results are consistent 
with those of Franks et al (1991), who refer that performance differences for the 
bidders in acquisitions paid in cash or stock exchange are not statistically significant. 
Nevertheless, these results are in contrast with the works of Asquith et al (1983), 
Travlos (1987), Eckbo and Langohr (1989) and Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), 
according to which bidders have poorer results when the acquisition is stock-financed, 
reflecting a low assessment of its assets-in-place. It is important to note that, as in the 
case of hostile offers, the small number of offers where the method of payment wasn’t 
exclusively cash can be the reason for why these variables have a low explanatory 
power for the bidders’ abnormal returns. Another explanation could be that, according 
to the Lei Sapateiro capital market regulations, stock offers should always have an 
alternative in cash, with investors being able to freely choose between the two. The 
variable LEGIS has a positive impact in the bidders’ abnormal returns, although it is 
not significant at conventional levels.  
 
                                                           
15 For instance, if financial resources are not as freely available in emerging markets in comparison to 
more developed markets, companies might be more choosy when looking at hostile targets.   29
Target Firms 
 
Table 14 shows the descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in the 
regression16: 
 
Table 14 – Descriptive statistics for the independent variables  
for the target firms. 
 
Mean Std. Deviation N
TARLS 0.512 0.243 49
TOEH 0.453 0.329 49
TARTOB 1.137 0.512 49
TARPERF 0.003 0.613 49
RELSIZE 6.138 4.274 49
HOST 0.122 0.331 49
METPAY 0.878 0.331 49
INDREL 0.837 0.373 49




  TARLS – Targets equity owned by large shareholders;  
  TOEH – Acquirers Toehold; 
  TARTOB – Targets Tobin’s q; 
TARPERF – Targets performance two years before the offer announcement; 
  RELSIZE – Relative Size; 
  HOST – Hostility; 
  METPAY – Method of payment; 
  INDREL – Industry relatedness; 
  LEGIS – Legislation dummy. 
 
The larger shareholders own, on average, 51.2% of the target firm. Bidding firms have 
large toeholds in the targets, on average, 45.3%. The acquiring firm is 6.1 times bigger 
than the target firm. Only 12.2% of the tender offers were hostile. The method of   30
payment mostly used was cash (almost 88% of the cases). About 83.7% of tender 
offers were industry related and 71.4% were launched during the period of “Lei 
Sapateiro” legislation. 
 
Correlation coefficients are presented in Table 15. 
 
Table 15 – Pearson Correlation analysis for the explanatory variables of the 
CARs of the Targets in the period (-40;+40) 
 
CARS TARLS TOEH TARTOB TARPERF RELSIZE HOST METPAY INDREL LEGIS
CARS 1.000 -0.566 -0.587 -0.320 -0.107 0.358 0.186 0.082 0.061 0.146
TARLS -0.566 1.000 0.772 0.184 0.259 -0.126 -0.550 -0.090 0.111 -0.348
TOEH -0.587 0.772 1.000 0.183 0.108 -0.170 -0.464 -0.089 0.061 -0.429
TARTOB -0.320 0.184 0.183 1.000 0.384 -0.030 0.095 -0.004 -0.147 -0.081
TARPERF -0.107 0.259 0.108 0.384 1.000 -0.083 -0.112 -0.036 -0.216 -0.161
RELSIZE 0.358 -0.126 -0.170 -0.030 -0.083 1.000 -0.059 0.148 -0.127 0.145
HOST 0.186 -0.550 -0.464 0.095 -0.112 -0.059 1.000 0.140 -0.172 0.236
METPAY 0.082 -0.090 -0.089 -0.004 -0.036 0.148 0.140 1.000 -0.165 -0.098
INDREL 0.061 0.111 0.061 -0.147 -0.216 -0.127 -0.172 -0.165 1.000 -0.035
LEGIS 0.146 -0.348 -0.429 -0.081 -0.161 0.145 0.236 -0.098 -0.035 1.000  
 
Legend: 
  TARLS – Targets equity owned by large shareholders;  
  TOEH – Acquirers Toehold; 
  TARTOB – Targets Tobin’s q; 
TARPERF – Targets performance two years before the offer announcement; 
  RELSIZE – Relative Size; 
  HOST – Hostility; 
  METPAY – Method of payment; 
  INDREL – Industry relatedness; 
  LEGIS – Legislation dummy. 
 
The results of the regression of the independent variables over the dependent variable 
(CARs) for the targets in the period (-40;+40) are shown in Table 16: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
16 It wasn’t possible for some firms to determine the variable ACQPERF. For this reason, our sample 
was slightly reduced from 52 offers to 49.    31
Table 16 – CARs regression for the targets during the period (-40;+40) around 
the announcement date of the tender offer. 
 
Coefficient (B) Std. Error t Significance
(Constant) 0.693 0.260 2.667 0.011
TARLS -0.595 0.304 -1.956 0.058
TOEH -0.374 0.219 -1.707 0.096
TARTOB -0.168 0.094 -1.790 0.081
TARPERF 0.085 0.081 1.052 0.299
RELSIZE 0.027 0.010 2.570 0.014
HOST -0.064 0.164 -0.389 0.699
METPAY -0.004 0.134 -0.032 0.975
INDREL 0.146 0.122 1.198 0.238
LEGIS -0.121 0.105 -1.146 0.259
R0 . 7 3 3
R² 0.538
R² adjust 0.431




  TARLS – Targets equity owned by large shareholders;  
  TOEH – Acquirers Toehold; 
  TARTOB – Targets Tobin’s q; 
TARPERF – Targets performance two years before the offer announcement; 
  RELSIZE – Relative Size; 
  HOST – Hostility; 
  METPAY – Method of payment; 
  INDREL – Industry relatedness; 
  LEGIS – Legislation dummy. 
 
The model has an explanatory power of 43.1%. The F statistic is sufficiently high to 
reject the null hypothesis that all independent variables have, simultaneously, a null 
effect on the dependent variable at a 1% level of significance. The variables of the 
ownership structure, TARLS and TOEH, are statistically significant at the 10% level 
and signed as predicted. The negative coefficient of the variable TARLS supports our 
hypothesis H1a that abnormal returns are smaller when the target has large 
shareholders, consistent with an efficient monitoring of the target in the period before   32
the announcement of the tender offer, leading to less inefficiencies for the bidder to 
correct, and therefore smaller returns for the target. Such results are consistent, among 
others, with the works of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Slusky and Caves (1991) and Sudarsanam et al (1996). 
The negative impact of TOEH17 supports our hypothesis H2a that the higher the 
toehold the smaller the premium paid by the bidder for acquiring the target. This is in 
accordance with hubris problems being diminished by the better information that the 
bidder has about the value of the target (including synergies). These results are 
consistent with the conclusions of Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), and Stulz et al 
(1990). They are, however, in contrast with the model of Choudhry and Jegadeesh 
(1994) and the results of Franks and Harris (1989). 
 
The target shareholders seem to gain more when their Tobin’s q is lower, as it can be 
noticed by the negative coefficient of the variable TARTOB. This might be 
interpreted as being in accordance with the idea that mergers and acquisitions have a 
disciplinary role, but also with the theories that the target can be undervalued in the 
stock market. Our results are therefore consistent with hypothesis H3b and consistent 
with the works of Lang et al (1989), Hasbrouck (1985) and Servaes (1991). In such 
perspective, the market for corporate control disciplines target managers that have a 
bad performance, replaced them by a more capable management team. 
 
Although it is not statistically significant at conventional levels, and contradicting the 
monitoring hypothesis for the occurrence of takeovers (Jensen, 1986), a good 
                                                           
17 In another experiment, the variable Tobin’s q was replaced by the variable Price/Book Value. The 
results were similar (coefficient of -0.0573, t of -2.055 and significance of 0.047). In terms of the 
explanatory power of the model, R² adjusted, it improves marginally to 44.5%.  
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performance by the target in the two years preceding the announcement of the tender 
offer (TARPERF18) appears to have a positive impact in the target shareholders 
abnormal returns. 
 
Regarding other control variables, one can notice that only the variable RELSIZE has 
a statistical significance (at the 5% level). Its coefficient suggests that target firms gain 
more when the relative size of the firms involved in the acquisition is more similar. 
Hence, these results are consistent with the works of Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) and 
Servaes (1991). As in the analysis of bidder returns, we could not find any statistically 
significant evidence of an impact of industry relatedness, hostility or method of 
payment in target returns. This implies that we found no strong support for the idea 
that bidders tend to pay with stock when they think their own stock price to be 
overvalued, with the market interpreting the choice of such method of payment as a 
negative sign for the acquiring firm. It is important to note, once again, that the 
reduced number of hostile offers and offers where the method of payment wasn’t 
exclusively cash can be the reason for our results and also why they have such a low 
explanatory power of the targets abnormal returns. A future work on this issue would 






                                                           
18 It was analysed the variable related to the acquiring firm performance during the three years that 
preceded the announcement of the tender offer. Consequently, our sample was reduced to 43 tender 
offers. The new variable presented a coefficient of 0.0057, t of 0.069 and significance of 0.946. 
Although the coefficient sign remains the same, the explanatory power of the model slightly improves 
to 50.0%.    34
Total Returns 
 
Since our sample includes 21 tender offers19 and the model has a high number of 
independent variables, the degrees of freedom of the regression are reduced. The 
results must therefore be interpreted cautiously.  
 
Table 17 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in the 
total returns regression: 
 
Table 17 – Descriptive statistics for the independent variables  
in the analysis of total returns. 
 
Mean Std. Deviation N
ACQLS 0.421 0.251 21
TARLS 0.527 0.212 21
TOEH 0.430 0.315 21
ACQTOB 1.234 0.401 21
TARTOB 1.182 0.475 21
ACQPERF 0.361 0.564 21
TARPERF 0.133 0.480 21
RELSIZE 5.776 6.172 21
HOST 0.191 0.402 21
METPAY 0.762 0.436 21
INDREL 0.810 0.402 21
LEGIS 0.762 0.436 21
 
Legend: 
  ACQLS – Acquirers equity owned by large shareholders;  
  TARLS – Targets equity owned by large shareholders;  
  TOEH – Acquirers Toehold; 
  ACQTOB – Acquirers Tobin’s q; 
  TARTOB – Targets Tobin’s q; 
ACQPERF – Acquirers performance two years before the offer announcement; 
TARPERF – Targets performance two years before the offer announcement; 
                                                           
19 Starting from a sample of 22 tender offers, the model was applied to 21 offers, since it wasn’t 
possible to collect all the data for one of the tender offers. 
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  RELSIZE – Relative Size; 
  HOST – Hostility; 
  METPAY – Method of payment; 
  INDREL – Industry relatedness; 
  LEGIS – Legislation dummy. 
 
The larger stockholders own, on average, 42.1% of the acquiring firm and 52.7% of 
the target firm. The toehold is once again large, on average 43.0%. The acquiring firm 
is 5.8 times bigger than the target firm. 19.1% of the tender offers were hostile. Cash 
was the preferred method of payment (76.2%). About 81.0% of the tender offers were 
industry related and 76.2% were launched during “Lei Sapateiro”. Correlation 
coefficients are presented in Table 18. 
 
Table 18 – Pearson Correlation analysis for the explanatory variables of the total 
abnormal returns in the period (-40;+40). 
 
CARS ACQLS TARLS TOEH ACQTOB TARTOB ACQPERF TARPERF RELSIZE HOST METPAY INDREL LEGIS
CARS 1.000 0.393 -0.047 0.081 0.290 0.265 0.054 0.076 -0.301 0.179 0.043 0.024 0.152
ACQLS 0.393 1.000 0.234 0.172 0.311 -0.289 0.102 0.123 -0.132 -0.233 0.156 -0.188 -0.189
TARLS -0.047 0.234 1.000 0.203 0.236 0.086 -0.292 0.588 -0.125 -0.703 -0.055 0.072 -0.191
TOEH 0.081 0.172 0.203 1.000 0.133 0.179 -0.294 -0.242 -0.061 -0.195 -0.017 0.219 -0.502
ACQTOB 0.290 0.311 0.236 0.133 1.000 0.099 0.233 0.496 0.009 -0.116 0.158 -0.317 0.028
TARTOB 0.265 -0.289 0.086 0.179 0.099 1.000 -0.180 0.186 -0.012 -0.034 0.107 0.294 0.143
ACQPERF 0.054 0.102 -0.292 -0.294 0.233 -0.180 1.000 0.252 -0.085 0.196 -0.163 -0.454 -0.033
TARPERF 0.076 0.123 0.588 -0.242 0.496 0.186 0.252 1.000 -0.237 -0.371 0.068 -0.188 0.003
RELSIZE -0.301 -0.132 -0.125 -0.061 0.009 -0.012 -0.085 -0.237 1.000 -0.176 0.062 -0.095 0.410
HOST 0.179 -0.233 -0.703 -0.195 -0.116 -0.034 0.196 -0.371 -0.176 1.000 0.271 -0.074 -0.014
METPAY 0.043 0.156 -0.055 -0.017 0.158 0.107 -0.163 0.068 0.062 0.271 1.000 -0.271 -0.050
INDREL 0.024 -0.188 0.072 0.219 -0.317 0.294 -0.454 -0.188 -0.095 -0.074 -0.271 1.000 0.298
LEGIS 0.152 -0.189 -0.191 -0.502 0.028 0.143 -0.033 0.003 0.410 -0.014 -0.050 0.298 1.000  
Legend: 
  ACQLS – Acquirers equity owned by large shareholders;  
  TARLS – Targets equity owned by large shareholders;  
  TOEH – Acquirers Toehold; 
  ACQTOB – Acquirers Tobin’s q; 
  TARTOB – Targets Tobin’s q; 
ACQPERF – Acquirers performance two years before the offer announcement; 
TARPERF – Targets performance two years before the offer announcement; 
  RELSIZE – Relative Size; 
  HOST – Hostility; 
  METPAY – Method of payment; 
  INDREL – Industry relatedness; 
  LEGIS – Legislation dummy   36
The results of the regression of the independent variables over the dependent variable 
(CARs) in the period (-40;+40) are presented in Table 19: 
 
Table 19 – Total CARs regression during the period (-40;+40) around the 
announcement date of the tender offer. 
 
Coefficient (B) Std. Error t Significance
(Constant) -0.408 0.374 -1.090 0.307
ACQLS 0.500 0.220 2.272 0.053
TARLS 0.066 0.421 0.156 0.880
TOEH 0.243 0.265 0.917 0.386
ACQTOB -0.026 0.172 -0.151 0.884
TARTOB 0.174 0.113 1.533 0.164
ACQPERF -0.061 0.120 -0.506 0.627
TARPERF 0.029 0.200 0.147 0.887
RELSIZE -0.013 0.010 -1.384 0.204
HOST 0.253 0.195 1.296 0.231
METPAY -0.142 0.134 -1.061 0.319
INDREL -0.222 0.183 -1.209 0.261







  ACQLS – Acquirers equity owned by large shareholders;  
  TARLS – Targets equity owned by large shareholders;  
  TOEH – Acquirers Toehold; 
  ACQTOB – Acquirers Tobin’s q; 
  TARTOB – Targets Tobin’s q; 
ACQPERF – Acquirers performance two years before the offer announcement; 
TARPERF – Targets performance two years before the offer announcement; 
  RELSIZE – Relative Size; 
  HOST – Hostility; 
  METPAY – Method of payment; 
  INDREL – Industry relatedness; 
  LEGIS – Legislation dummy. 
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The model has an explanatory power of just about 11.9%. Nonetheless, the variable 
ACQLS is statistically significant at a 5% level. Total returns appear therefore to be 
higher in the presence of a greater percentage owned by large shareholders in the 
acquiring firm. This suggests that the presence of such shareholders can increase the 
likelihood of a good assessment by the market of the prospects for an overall value 
creation following the announcement of the bid.  
 
4.6 Additional tests 
 
Returns in bull versus bear markets 
 
An extension of our study was to explore the possibility that the observed returns may 
differ according to the particular climate of the stock market. Several authors have 
documented that capital market conditions are an importance influence in the volume 
of M&A activity (see for example Melicher et al, 1983) so an impact on returns is 
likely. Little research, however, has been produced in this regard. Table 20 reports our 
findings when we split returns between a “bull market” period (i.e., when overall 
stock market returns are positive, defined in our sample as from 1993 to 1999) and a 
“bear market” (i.e, when overall stock market returns are negative, defined in our 
sample as from 2000 to 2001): 
 
Table 20 – Acquirer and Target Abnormal Returns during Bull (1993-99) and 
Bear Markets (2000-01) 
 
Period  Acquirer CARs (-40,+40)  Target CARs (-40,+40) 
Bull Market (1993-99) 





Bear Market (2000-01) 
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It can be observed in the above table not only that returns are generally higher for both 
targets and acquirers in the bull market period, but also that the overall (for both bull 
and bear markets) return close to zero for acquirers hides the fact that this seems to be 
the outcome of significantly positive returns in the bull market period and 
significantly negative returns during bear markets. For both targets and acquirers the 
return differentials in the two periods are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Although the sample size is relatively small, the magnitude of the differential returns 
and its statistical significance strongly suggest that acquiring managers ought to 
seriously consider the timing of their acquisitions, given the strong negative impact of 
a bearish capital market environment, in sharp contrast with a bullish climate. Further 
research on this issue is clearly warranted20. 
 
 
Determinants for the weight of run-up returns in overall target returns 
 
Given the importance of the run-up effect for target shareholders documented in this 
study, we also tried to investigate the determinants for the size of run-up returns as a 
fraction of total returns for targets. Since we are concerned with the instances where 
run-ups are significant, we limited our analysis to transactions where run-up returns 
exceed 1%. In this exploratory analysis, and given the limited literature on the 
determinants of the run-up relative size, we tentatively used as control variables 
basically the same variables as in the regression analysis above for total target returns, 
                                                           
20 To analyse if the regression results shown in Tables 13, 16 and 19 would be affected by the inclusion 
of a variable accounting for the bullishness of bearishness of stock market conditions at the time of the 
bid announcement, separate regressions were run with the inclusion of the dummy variable 
BULLBEAR (where 1-Bear Market and 0-Bull Market). No significant changes in the major results 
reported on those tables occurred, however, when such inclusion was done. 
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with the addition of the target CAR as an explanatory variable to control for a “CAR 
size effect” and the exclusion of industry relatedness21. Our major hypothesis, 
however, is that toeholds previously held by acquirers might be a significant 
determinant for the relative size of run-up returns. This can be due, for instance, to 
either (i) the building-up of the toehold position immediately before the 
announcement of the M&A transaction or (ii) a stronger incentive to avoid 
information leakage when an initial toehold is small given the potentially large cost 
that a strong run-up would imply considering the above documented result that run-up 
returns are an extra cost for acquirers. For these reasons we would thus expect a 
positive relationship between toeholds and the relative importance of run-up returns. 
Table 21 below presents the regression analysis results for the determinants of the 
ratio between run-up returns and total abnormal target returns where the relevant 






















                                                           
21 We excluded industry relatedness as a determinant for which we could not think of any reasonable 
justification for its impact on the relative size of the run-up. Such exclusion, however, does not alter the 
major results reported in table 21.   40
Table 21 – Regression Analysis of the determinants of the ratio of 




  TARCAR – Total CAR for target shareholders in the period (-40;+40); 
  TARLS – Targets equity owned by large shareholders;  
  TOEH – Acquirers Toehold; 
  TARTOB – Targets Tobin’s q; 
TARPERF – Targets performance two years before the offer announcement; 
  RELSIZE – Relative Size between acquirer and target; 
  HOST – Hostility; 
  METPAY – Method of payment; 
  LEGIS – Legislation dummy. 
 
The results in the table above confirm our hypothesis that acquirers’ toeholds are a 
major positive influence on the relative magnitude of run-up returns on total target 
abnormal returns. When larger toeholds are present, the run-up as a percentage of total 
target abnormal return is significantly larger (p-value of 0.08). In addition, our 
findings show that hostility in the M&A reduces the relative size of the run-up 
(possibly due to the greater care by hostile acquirers in avoiding information 
  Coefficient (B)  Std Error  t  Significance 
        
(Constant)  -1.055  1.595 -0.66 0.515 
TARCAR  0.736  0.900 0.82 0.422 
TARLS  -3.427  1.748 -1.96 0.062 
TOEH  2.611  1.434 1.82 0.081 
TARTOB  0.906  0.679 1.33 0.195 
TARPERF  -0.155  0.416 -0.37 0.713 
RELSIZE  0.099  0.079 1.26 0.221 
HOST  -1.832  0.781 -2.35 0.028 
METPAY  0.435  1.008 0.43 0.670 
LEGIS  0.142  0.566 0.25 0.804 
        
R 0.627       
R
2 0.393       
R
2 adjust.  0.166       
        
F 1.730       
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leakages), while the existence of large shareholders in the target is a significantly 
negative influence on the relative importance of run-ups. This last effect is the result, 
perhaps, of smaller shareholder dispersion and liquidity or a lower degree of 
information leakage when larger shareholders dominate the ownership structure of the 
target. 
 
Overall, and although our results here are exploratory, they point at a number of 
promising directions where little research has been made, not just in the context of 
emerging markets but also in more developed capital markets. 
 
5  Summary and discussion of findings 
 
This paper builds on the existing M&A literature, which is almost exclusively focused 
on well developed equity markets, by providing further evidence on some 
particularities of such transactions in an emerging market. Using a sample of 52 
targets over a relatively long period of time (1989-2001) in the Portuguese market, our 
major results can be summarized as follows. First, we observe target abnormal returns 
of about 23% for tender offers for the window (-40;+40). Not only such returns are of 
smaller magnitude than those observed for the UK and US, but also below those 
shown by Ocaña et al (1997) for the Spanish market, for comparable windows. 
Possible explanations for this result may be either the presence, which we document, 
of large shareholders in both bidders (with an average of 39% held by such 
shareholders) and targets (51% held by those investors), or the existence of significant 
initial toeholds by the bidder (an average 45% of the target shares). Also we present 
evidence that abnormal returns for both bidders and targets are substantially lower in   42
bearish markets as compared to bullish markets, with acquirers experiencing sizeable 
negative abnormal returns in bear markets but positive ones in bull periods. 
 
In addition, we confirm Ocaña et al’s (1997) observation that the run-up effect seems 
to be quite high in emerging markets when comparing to the UK or US. In fact, we 
report evidence that the abnormal returns in the window (-40,0) before the 
announcement date correspond to 13%, or almost sixty percent of total returns for 
targets. Why this apparent information leakage is of such relative magnitude in 
emerging markets like Portugal or Spain (Ocaña et al, 1997) is a relevant concern, 
particularly since we observe, following Schwert (1996), that the existence of such 
run-up in target prices does not reduce the size of the return after announcement, 
therefore increasing the cost of the acquisition for bidders. To address such questions 
we undertook an exploratory analysis where we report evidence that acquirer toeholds 
are positively related to the relative magnitude of the run-up effect (as a fraction of 
total abnormal return), while hostility and the presence of large shareholders in the 
target have a negative impact on this. These are potentially important clues for the 
question of why run-ups are important in the context of M&A transactions, and 
particularly so in emerging markets. 
 
Finally, we show evidence that the presence of large shareholders and toeholds in the 
target has a significant impact in both bidder and target returns. Specifically, we 
document that the presence of large shareholders in the bidding firms significantly 
increases returns for bidders, as well as acquirer toeholds in the target. In contrast, the 
existence of large shareholders in the targets and important bidder toeholds 
significantly reduce target abnormal returns. This is in accordance with existing 
models (Schleifer and Vishny, 1986, Hirshleifer and Titman, 1990), and strengthens at   43
the same time the argument that in emerging markets most M&A transactions seem to 
have distinct characteristics from those observed in well developed markets where 
toeholds and the presence of large shareholders are usually much smaller22, helping to 
explain the differences in the size of target returns vis-à-vis those observed in well 
developed markets. 
 
Some caveats should be kept in mind. Given the characteristics of the market in 
question (and indeed of most emerging markets), the size of the sample is relatively 
small, making it difficult do draw strong inferences. Also, we could not obtain enough 
data on managerial ownership which could be used to more refined tests on the impact 
of ownership structure on returns. In addition, for some smaller firms in the sample 
liquidity in the stock market is small, potentially affecting the ability of stock prices to 
reflect at all times the flow of new information to the market. Directions for future 
research would then naturally be the extension of this study for a larger number of 
emerging markets, but also an attempt to understand why in these markets the 
information leakage seems to be so high as compared to well developed markets, 
namely if this is due to insider trading, rumors, regulatory problems, the particular 
nature of informational asymmetries in such markets or other causes. A direction for 
this research was pointed out in our exploratory analysis where we uncovered the 
importance of toeholds and large shareholders in targets as possibly significant 
determinants of the relative magnitude of run-up returns. In addition, specific agency 
problems and corporate governance issues could also be addressed, considering the 
particular context of high ownership concentration, large initial toeholds, and potential 
conflicts with minority shareholders in M&A transactions in emerging markets. 
                                                           
22 For instance, Sudarsanam et al (1996) report that the average toehold is of 6% in the UK, while large 
shareholders do not exceed 11% in bidders and 16% in targets.   44
Finally, an also largely unaddressed question is the timing of tender offers in such 
markets, namely the issue of why and when do firms which to a large extent already 
control a listed firm suddenly decide to increase their stake by launching a tender offer 
for the remaining shares.  
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